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John Hadley: Animal Property Rights: A Theory of Habitat Rights for Wild 
Animals 
Lexington Books, Lanham, MA, 2015, x + 142 pp. 
 
Upon seeing ³DQLPDO´DQG³SURSHUW\´LQDZRUN¶Vtitle, RQH¶Vmind may be drawn to 
WKHHQWUHQFKHGGHEDWHVDERXWQRQKXPDQDQLPDOV KHUHDIWHU³DQLPDOV´ as property. This is 
QRW WKH IRFXV RI -RKQ +DGOH\¶V Animal Property Rights. Instead, Hadley argues that free-
OLYLQJ³ZLOG´ animals have a particular kind of property right in their territory, meaning that 
their access to and free use of the natural goods in their territory should not be unduly limited 
by humans. This theory of animal property rights has two central conceptual elements: a 
system of guardianship and the use of territory to demarcate animal property. The 
guardianship system requires the appointment of a human who can DFWRQWKHDQLPDOV¶EHKDOI 
most clearly coming WR WKHIRUHZKHQDQLPDOV¶SURSHUW\ULJKWVFODVKZLWKKXPDQV¶SURSHUW\
rights. For example, if I seek to develop my land, but it is land used by an assortment of 
animals, I should, Hadley says, be legally obliged to engage in mediation with the animals 
(represented by their guardian) in order to work out an amicable way forward, respectful of 
their right to access and make use of the ³natural resources´ on the land. This does not mean 
that I would be unable to develop my land in all circumstances, but I may be obliged to make 
provisions fRU WKH DQLPDOV +DGOH\ UHFRJQL]HV WKDW WKH VHFRQG NH\ FRQFHSW ³WerriWRU\´ LV
contentious. It can be difficult to judge what behaviours make a parcel of land into the 
³WHUULWRU\´ RI D SDUWLFXODU JURXS RI DQLPDOV DQG HVWLPDWLRQV RI WKH VL]H RI WHUULWRULHV 
among experts can vary quite considerably. Nonetheless, it is a concept already used in real-
world property discussions. As such, ³WKHGHWDLOIURPZKLFK WRVKDSH WKHFRQWHQWRIDQLPDO
property rights does not come from philosophical fantasy, but the same scientific sources 
deemed credible enough to shape human property ULJKWV LQFLGHQWV´ ± think of protection 
zones for vulnerable species ± so ³LW¶V FOHDU WKDW WKH SURSHUW\ ULJKWV RI DQLPDOV FDQ EH
packaged in such a way as to mesh with existing economic, political, and legal institutions 
ZKLFKKDYHDEHDULQJRQWKHSUDFWLFDOGLPHQVLRQVRIRZQHUVKLS´ 
+DGOH\¶V DUJXPHQW LV SUHVHQWHG DJDLQVW WKH EDFNJURXQG RI WKH FRQWHPSRUDU\
institution of property (1-6). The book ultimately has a highly pragmatic focus ± the author is 
concerned with presenting a particular policy proposal in as positive a light (and to as broad 
an audience) as possible. To that end, we find not merely arguments for the conclusion that 
animals can and should be considered property owners, but explDQDWLRQVRIZKHUHDQLPDOV¶
property rights would fit in to, and how they compare to, existing property arrangements. 
These are just examples; Hadley, a philosopher, seems happy to leave fuller development of 
the areas of his theory requiring specific legal/ecological expertise to others (123). He is also 
concerned with reconciling animal ethicists and environmental ethicists, at least insofar as 
both could see merit in animal property rights. This is raised repeatedly, and Chapter 5 is 
devoted to the issue. As Hadley seems to admit (93), this sometimes takes the book off-topic; 
for example, a discussion (78-80) of therapeutic killing (that is, the killing of animals of 
overabundant or introduced species for environmental purposes) seems to be unrelated to the 
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ERRN¶V PDLQ DUJXPHQW. 1RQHWKHOHVV +DGOH\¶V SURSRVDO GRHV KDYH JHQXLQH SRWHQWLDO IRU
reconciliation of animal and environmental ethicists/activists, at least on this one issue. It is 
QRW WKH ³JROGHQ EXOOHW´ that will finally and forever ally WKH ³WUHH-huggers and the Bambi-
ORYHUV´EXWmaybe policy convergence is the best we can hope for ± both groups, though for 
different reasons, should agree about (for example) veganism, clean energy, and now, we 
might add, animal property rights. 
Overall, +DGOH\¶V pragmatic focus is quite refreshing. Philosophical minutiae are 
avoided and the position is presented in a positive light from a variety of perspectives. Hadley 
is sometimes a little too dismissive of theoretical differences. For example, he refuses to take 
DVLGHRQWKH³ORFDWLRQTXHVWLRQ´ ± whether the source of value is individual sentient animals 
or relationships between natural entities ± and JRHV VR IDU DV WR FODLP WKDW ³QRWKLQJ DERXW
protecting animals or ecosystems in the real world turns oQLWVRXWFRPH´This is surely 
incorrect; for example, disagreements about therapeutic killing seem to rest, at least in part, 
on a disagreement concerning the location question. Despite possible 
metaphysical/metaethical disagreements with more orthodox animal ethicists, I suspect that 
Hadley is more animal than environmental ethicist when it comes to the location question. 
Another relevant disciplinary split LVWKDWEHWZHHQWKH³ROG´DQG³QHZ´DQLPDOHWKLFLVWV3HWHU
Singer (1975) and Tom Regan (1984) DUHSDUDGLJPDWLFRI WKHROG³PRUDO´DSSURDFKZKLOH
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011) DUHSDUDGLJPDWLFRIWKHQHZ³SROLWLFDO´DSSURDFK
Hadley seems to align himself with the old approach (8, 76, 87, 91, 117), even while 
criticising the new approach ± QDPHO\'RQDOGVRQDQG.\POLFND¶VVRYHUHLJQW\SURSRVDO-
94) ± for exaggerating differences between the two. I found this particularly interesting for 
WZRUHDVRQV)LUVW+DGOH\¶VSURMHFWLVLn many ways typical of the new approaches. It appeals 
to liberal values, focuses on interests while retaining rights-talk, stresses deliberation with 
animals, offers the argument from species overlap1 little space and is highly pragmatic (cf. 
Milligan 2015). Second, I do not think (despite both sides¶GHVLUHWRGLVWDQFHWKHPVHOYHVIURP
the other) that animal property rights and animal sovereignty theory are as far apart as they 
may seem ± indeed, they may actually be compatible (cf. Cooke, forthcoming). 
Other than the importance of the central proposal, I think the book is at its best ± and 
likely of most interest to readers of this journal ± when it is exploring justifications for the 
institution of animal property rights. The work is not a simple premises-argument-conclusion 
philosophical treatise. Instead, after outlining the proposal, Hadley explores several separate 
arguments for it. Chapter 3 sees development of classic labour and first occupancy theories of 
ownership, while Chapter 4 looks to the basic needs of animals. Though this is not made 
explicit, perhaps Chapter 3 is directed at property theorists and Chapter 4 is directed at animal 
ethicists. Another ± this time indirect ± approach is offered in Chapter 6 (³3UDFWLFH DQG
Pragmatism´) which LV OLNHO\ DLPHG DW HQYLURQPHQWDOLVWV +DGOH\¶V FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI
extending the Lockean labour criterion of acquisition (as well as the Lockean proviso) to 
animals is thoughtful and clear. There is likely more to be said for (or at least about) it (cf. 
Milburn 2014), but, admittedly, an account of animal property rights based wholly on this 
EDVLVZRXOGORRNYHU\GLIIHUHQWIURP+DGOH\¶V)RUH[DPSOH± putting to one side important 
                                                          
1
 Also called the argument from marginal cases; see Horta 2014. 
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questions concerning intentionality (42-44) ± a labour-based account of animal property 
rights might be very good at protecting certain interests possessed by industrious animals like 
nest-building birds, but much worse at protecting the interests of animals who do not 
³ODERXU´LQWKHVDPHZD\VXFKDVWKRVHEHORQJLQJWRFHUWDLQVHD-faring or coastal species. Of 
course, these animals could have at least as much interest in their habitats being protected 
from human development as do nesting birds. ,W¶V DOVR XQFOHDU KRZ ZHOO D ODERXU WKHRU\
could be used as the basis of habitat rights in general, given that many animals, unlike 
humans, do not work the land. 
Hadley ultimately rejects labour accounts, along with first occupancy accounts, as 
being too tied up with personhood to suitably ground animal property rights. Instead, he 
favours an interest-EDVHGDFFRXQW*LYHQWKDWDQLPDOVKDYHDVWURQJ³LQWHUHVWLQXVLQJQDWXUDO
JRRGV«WRPHHWWKHLUEDVLFQHHGVDQGWKRVHRIWKHLURIIVSULQJ´ (54), they have a right to do 
so, which gives rise to a property right. Hadley does not explicitly tie this into an interest 
rights approach to animal ethics (eg, Cochrane 2012), but simply compares the significance 
of DQLPDOV¶ IXQGDPHQWDO LQWHUHVWs in satisfying their basic needs to the trivial interests of 
humans generally accepted as sufficient for property. The final possible justification Hadley 
proposes comes from a human interest in seeing certain habitats or species protected. In these 
indirect terms, animal property rights become a tool to be applied, be it selectively or broadly, 
be it in the spirit of cooperation or to respond to disaster (106). This comes across as a 
³VHFRQGEHVW´DUJXPHQWLIWKHLQWHUHVWDUJXPHQWIDLOV+DGOH\ZLOOIDOOEDFNonto the indirect 
justification. I was pleasantly surprised to see a brief defence (107-8) of much-maligned 
indirect duties to animals. IW GRHVQ¶W PDWWHU to the animals themselves, says Hadley, why 
WKH\¶UHSURWHFWHG 
+DGOH\¶V ERRN LV VKRUW2 and so does not address everything that might be said. I 
would like to close this review by raising three questions that might serve as starting points 
for further debate. 
First, I am left questioning the relationship of animal property rights to animal ethics 
more broadly. Hadley ± quite deliberately ± does not present a full account of animal rights. It 
might be easy to imagine an animal ethicist, and especially an interest rights theorist, simply 
adding animal property rights into an existing normative framework. Hadley even thinks that 
there has always been an idea of animal property rights implicit in traditional approaches to 
animal rights (76). But I wonder how central an account of animal property should be to 
animal rights frameworks. And while it makes conceptual sense to separate animal property 
rights from animal rights more broadly, it could potentially lead to some odd situations. The 
DQLPDOV¶ DGYRFDWH might be tasked with arguing against the development of DQLPDOV¶
territory, while nonetheless lacking power and authority to challenge senseless slaughter. 
7KLV FRXOG HYHQ OHDG WR D SDUWLFXODU NLQG RI ³UHSXJQDQW FRQFOXVLRQ´ DOO GHYHORSHUV ZRXOG
KDYHWRGRWRHQVXUHWKDWWKH\GRQRWWUHDGRYHUWKHDQLPDOV¶LQWHUHVWLQDFFHVVWRXVHRI the 
land would be to kill said animals. Rabbits possess no interest in using their land if they have 
all been shot, no matter how articulate and knowledgeable their advocate. 
                                                          
2
 After the exclusion of blank pages, the glossary and such, it is little over 100 pages. 
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Second, it is unclear where ³OLPLQDO´ animals, those neither fully wild nor fully 
domesticated, ILWLQWR+DGOH\¶VSLFWXUH*UDQWHGDQLPDOSURSHUW\ULJKWVH[LVWIRUZLOG rather 
than domesticated animals. But liminal animals are imperfectly FDSWXUHGE\+DGOH\¶VDFFRXQW
of VRPH DQLPDOV¶ ³GRXEOH-FKDUDFWHU´ ± alternating between wild and domesticated (67-8). 
Does Hadley want to give urban gulls property rights over the buildings upon which they 
live? How about the bins from which they feed? Perhaps, in a reversal of the norm, these 
DQLPDOV¶ advocates would demand that humans continue to habituate and develop the 
territory, casting aside unwanted food and leaving litter exposed. (And this kind of reversal is 
not a uniquely urban possibility ± farmland, for example, is an important habitat for many 
animals.) One might claim that I am heUH VWUHWFKLQJ ³QDWXUDO JRRGV´ WRR IDU RU WKDW WKH
advocate would be overstepping her jurisdiction, but perhaps others would accept this 
conclusion. My point is that there is likely room for careful thought about if/how liminal 
animals fit into the theory of animal property rights. 
Third, and this is perhaps the biggest question of all, we have to ask to what extent 
Hadley is actually talking about property rights. Even in the subtitle of the book, we find that 
property rights have become habitat rights. Hadley has a particular conception of what a 
SURSHUW\ULJKWFRQVLVWVLQKHEHJLQVZLWKDQLPDOV¶LQWHUHVWLQXVLQJWHUULWRU\WUDQVODWHVWKLVLQ
a right WRXVHWHUULWRU\DQGWKHQFODLPVWKDW³LIDQLPDOVKDYHa right to use natural goods this 
means that, logically, they have a property ULJKW LQ WKH JRRG FRQFHUQHG´  HPSKDVLV
+DGOH\¶VThis is a logical jump that many readers will be unwilling to take. There are many 
natural goods that we are free to use which are not our property. Air and sunlight are obvious 
examples. Furthermore, iW¶VXQFOHDULIWKHDQLPDOV¶SXWDWLYH³SURSHUW\´ULJKWs extend beyond a 
right to use, and possibly the right to exclude ± specifically, exclude certain human activities 
(9-10) ± which may amount to the same thing. Even despite this, we find that ³animal 
property rights´ and ³property rights´ DUHGLVWLQFW,QWHUHVWV+DGOH\FODLPVFDQ³JLYHULVHWR
a property right. In so far as the individual with the interest is an animal, the property right in 
question is an animal SURSHUW\ULJKW´HPSKDVLV+DGOH\¶V%XW³DQLPDOSURSHUW\ULJKWV
are conceptually distinctive because WKH\FRH[LVWZLWKWKHSURSHUW\ULJKWVRIKXPDQEHLQJV´
(15). This distinction seems to be taken as a starting assumption of the theory, and is likely a 
FRQVHTXHQFH RI +DGOH\¶V SUDJPDWLVP DQLPDO SURSHUW\ ULJKWV DUH a tool with a particular 
purpose. They are not, for example, for pushing humans off property, or for protecting 
animals from each other7KH\¶UHMXVWDZD\WRKDYHKXPDQVSD\DWWHQWLRQWo certain kinds of 
animal interests ± their interest in the natural goods within their territory. But then perhaps 
+DGOH\ LVQ¶W really proposing property rights at all; perhaps he is proposing a system for 
UHFRJQLVLQJDQGSURWHFWLQJDQLPDOV¶OHJLWLPDWHLQWerest in access to their habitat/territory and 
the free use of the natural goods contained therein3HUKDSV³SURSHUW\´LVVKRUWKDQG 
As an idea, animal property rights are new, important and exciting; the theory 
warrants attention. As a book, Animal Property Rights LV HQJDJLQJ DQG UHDGDEOH +DGOH\¶V
prose is clear and concise, his ideas comprehensible and realistic. I think some philosophers 
may find the pragmatic focus frustrating; precisely the issues Hadley brushes over are the 
ones in which some are most interested. ThisFRPELQHGZLWKWKHERRN¶Vshort length, leaves 
much room for further work on the question, and I hope this will be forthcoming. 
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